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HMOs, ERISA's "RELATE TO" PREEMPTION AND A
PATIENT'S RIGHT TO AN EXTERNAL REVIEW OF
MEDICAL NECESSITY DECISIONS AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF FIELD AND CONFLICT
PREEMPTION*
L. Darnell Weeden**

INTRODUCTION
More than a generation ago in 1974, the United States Congress passed
a law called the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to
advance the rights of employees.' ERISA was generally perceived as
legislation that was designed to protect an employee's economic
investment in an employer provided benefit plan. Legal commentators
Stempel and Magdenko recently observed that in the beginning neither

This article was written prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, availableat 2002 WL 1337696.
Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University,
B.A., J.D.,
University of Mississippi. I would like to thank Anya Anga, Reference Librarian at Thurgood
Marshall Law School for her support and assistance. I would also like to thank Kimberly M.
Westley, Research Assistant at Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Class of 2003, for her valuable
comments concerning earlier drafts of this article. This project was supported by a grant from the
Texas Southern University Research Center.
'29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
229 U.S.C. § 1001(a) "The Congress finds that... the continued well-being and security
of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these [benefit] plans; that
they are affected with a national public interest; that they have become an important factor
affecting the stability of employment and the successful development of industrial relations"
Id.
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friend nor foe of the new ERISA law conceived that
it had any
3
benefits.
care
health
furnished
employer
implications for
In 1983, nine years after ERISA became the law of the land, the
Supreme Court adopted the view that Congress intended for ERISA's
preemption impact to be liberally applied to any employer furnished
benefits. 4 The Supreme Court's historical expansive preemption
rationale in Shaw holds that a state law is under ERISA's preemption
restrictions if it is in any way related to an employees' benefit plan.5 On
its face, ERISA's preemption rationale appears to apply to "any state
laws" that relate to an employee benefit plan6 not specifically excluded
from coverage by ERISA.7
3
See Jeffery W. Stempel & Nadia von Magdenko, Doctors, HMOs, ERISA and the
Public4InterestAfter Pegram v. Herdrich,36 TORT & INs. L.J. 687, 688 & n.6 (2001).
Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
We have no difficulty in concluding that the Human Rights Law and
Disability Benefits Law 'relate to' employee benefit plans. The breadth of
§ 514(a)'s 29 U.S.C.§ 1144 (a) pre-emptive reach is apparent from that
section's language. A law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the
normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such
a plan. Employing this definition, the Human Rights Law, which prohibits
employers from structuring their employee benefit plans in a manner that
discriminates on the basis of pregnancy, and the Disability Benefits Law,
which requires employers to pay employees specific benefits, clearly 'relate
to' benefit plans. We must give effect to this plain language unless there is
good reason to believe Congress intended the language to have some more
restrictive meaning.
Id. at 96-98.
5

.

d.

629 U.S.C. § 1144 (a). "(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the
provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in
section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section
shall take effect on January 1, 1975." Id.
7
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97. "State laws regulating insurance, banking, or securities are
exempt from this [ERISA] pre-emption provision as, are generally applicable state criminal
laws." Id. at 85. See 29 U.S.C.§ 1144(b)(2)(A) which provides "Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person
from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." See 29 U.S.C.§
1144(b)(2)(B) that provides "Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of
this title, which is not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established
primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a
plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or
investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of
any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks,
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Because ERISA's preemption rationale includes medical decisions
about whether a particular course of treatment is medically necessary, it
is important to develop legal theories to limit the preemption's deadly
effects on precluding states from granting its citizens a patient's bill of
rights against HMOs. One commentator stated in 1999 that she
believed the Supreme Court retreated from its comprehensive version
of ERISA's preemption purpose to a less extensive application of the
statute's "relates to language." 8 I am not sure those commentators who
believe that the Supreme Court has sent a clear signal of hope that it is
prepared to limit the impact that preemption has on medical treatment
decisions by HMOs is justified. However, I agree with the conclusion
of Stempel and Magdenko 9 that the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Pegram v. Herdrichl° may suggest, in a rather obscure manner, that
HMOs operating under an ERISA plan may nevertheless be liable for
damages in a traditional state law torts cause of action for its
involvement in a decision about medical treatment."
trust companies, or investment companies." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4) provides" Subsection (a) of
this section shall not apply to any generally applicable criminal law of a State."
8
Dawn Lauren Morris, Comment, ERISA Preemption,HMOs And The Denial ofBenefits
Claims, 59 LA. L. REv. 961, 963 (1999). "The Court has moved from its broad and expansive
interpretation of ERISA preemption to a narrower construction of the 'relates to' terminology
in the preemption clause. This interpretation has served to narrow the gap, and it has opened
the door for state and federal courts to recognize theories of liability against HMOs, including
those for claims of denial of benefits." Id. at 963.
9
Stempel and Magdenko, supra note 3, at 717-725.
lId. (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S.Ct 2143 (2000)).
11Id. Pegram both gives and takes away from HMOs. On the one (obvious) hand, the
decision is helpful to HMOs in that it relieves them of possible fiduciary obligation and
liability under the ERISA statute that provides for penalties and counsel fees for prevailing
plaintiffs. On the other (less obvious) hand, the decision suggests that HMOs should not be
immune from otherwise valid state law claims against health care providers or physicians for
negligence, misrepresentation, or fraud simply because the HMO is providing its services as a
vendor under an ERISA plan.
The HMO making mixed or purely medical decisions is indistinguishable
from the treating physician, at least as concerns ERISA. Also, we now
conclusively know that the Court has no absolute objection to physician
liability under these circumstances. The Court noted without disapproval
that Herdrich's original malpractice claim was tried to a jury and resulted in
a $35,000 award. The Court also noted that states vary regarding whether
to "allow malpractice actions against IMOs," suggesting that there is no
ERISA bar to such state law tort actions against HMOs.
Id. (citations omitted)
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Two years ago, in 2000, two federal appeals courts, the Fifth
Circuit, 12 and Seventh Circuit13 reached opposite conclusions about the
reach of ERISA's preemptive arm on state laws providing for a separate
and independent inspection of an HMO's denial of a proposed medical
treatment plan. One commentator appropriately characterized the issue
presented before the two circuits as-whether a state's legal process for
granting independent review of an HIMO's medical treatment decisions
is. preempted by ERISA. 1 4 On: June 29, 2001, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Rush PrudentialHMO, Inc. v. Moran15 to decide
whether a state's granting a patient an independent review procedure
when the I4O has denied him/her medical treatment is permissible
under ERISA. On January 16, 2002, the Supreme
Court heard oral
16
argument in Rush PrudentialHMO, Inc. v. Moran.
Part I of this article presents the facts and procedural setting for the
legal disputes discussed by the Fifth Circuit in Corporate Health
Insurance v. Texas Department of Insurance17 with an analysis of
ERISA's "relate to" preemptive reach. Part II of this article provides a
brief analysis of the Seventh Circuit decision in Moran v. Rush
PrudentialHMO, Inc.1 8 Part ITexamines a copy of the transcript of the
oral argument before the Supreme Court in Rush PrudentialHMO, Inc.
v. Moran for insights on how the court decided these.' 9 The epic battle
12Corporate Health Ins. v. Texas Dept. of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000), motion for
panel rehearingand petition for rehearingen banc denied, Corp. Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas
Dept. of Ins., 220 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert.filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3317 (U.S.
Oct. 24, 2000) (No.00-665).
13Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000).
4
Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Constructionand Application of State PatientBill of
Rights Statutes, 87 A.L.R. 5kh 277 (2001) (§ 51 of the annotation discusses ERISA's premption of statutes providing for independent review of health maintenance organization's
rejection of procedure as medically unnecessary.)
'5Moran, 230 F3d at 959, cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 2589 (C.S. Jun 29, 2001) (No 001021).
'6See 2002 WL 63589.
17
CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d 526.
8
' Moran, 230 F3d 959.
i RSee 2002 WL 63589 for a copy of the United States Supreme Court official transcript
in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran; For U.S. Supreme Court Briefs filed in Rush
Prudential IMO, Inc. v. Moran see 2001 WL 1090765 (Pet. Brief); 2001 WL 1548340 (Resp.
Brief); 2001 WL 1590509 (Reply Brief); 2001 WL 1684554 (Resp. Brief); 2001 WL 1077919
(Amicus Brief); 2001 WL 1480556 (Amicus Brief); 2001 WL 1575922 (Amicus Brief) 2001
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between a right to review an HMO's denial of medical treatment and a
federal preemptive interest in protecting an HMO's right to make a
profitable treatment decision free of independent review is ironic
because the purpose of ERISA was to protect employee rights. After
the holdings in the two aforementioned cases, employees now fear the
ERISA legislation. I believe the ERISA preemption battle is a question
of how to accommodate reasonable necessary profits for a company
involved in providing medical services while assuring that there is a fair
review process for determining when a treatment is medically
necessary.
CORPORATE HEALTH INSURANCE V. TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
Facts and Procedural History
On May 22, 1997, Texas law changed the legal playing field for those
involved in the managed care industry in the state. The Texas
legislature recently enacted new law expanding the rights of individuals
against HMOs. 20 Although I consider the new legislation a patient's
bill of rights, the new law provides important protections for doctors
against HMOs as well. Under the new law, a Texas patient has a right
to sue HMOs that are negligent in making "health care treatment
decisions."21 The right to sue your H1MO provision in the law was
characterized by the Fifth Circuit as the liability portion of the law.2 2 A
second part of the law called the "independent review requirement"
gives patients certain procedural rights while obtaining an independent
review of whether a health care treatment is medically necessary. 23 A
third section of the law is designed to protect doctors who engage in the
practice of advocating their patient's right to appropriate medical

WL 1576954 (Amicus Brief); 2001 WL 1590504 (Amicus Brief); 2001 WL 1673395 (Amicus
Brief). Id.
2T)Ex. Civ. PRAc. & REm.CODE ANN. § 88.001 et seq. (Vernon 2002). This law became
on May 22, 1997.
effective
21
CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 530.
22Id.

23Id.
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treatment from both an HMO ordained indemnity clause and an HMO
ordered retaliation. 24
The plaintiffs in this litigation challenged a state's ability to
regulate the conduct of HIMOs and other managed care operators that
provide health related services under an ERISA sponsored plan because
of ERISA's preemption rationale. 25 The plaintiffs argue that the Texas
law 26 is unconstitutional because it is "preempted by ERISA's general
preemption clause ...
[that] preempts all law relating to any employee
benefit plan."2 7 The plaintiffs also advanced the theory that the Texas
law was unconstitutional because it was
preempted by the Federal
28
(FEHBA)
Act
Benefit
Health
Employees
At the district court level all parties involved in the lawsuit filed
cross motions requesting summary judgment. 29 The federal district
court granted some of the cross motions for summary judgment while
denying others. 30 The federal trial court held that neither ERISA nor the
FEHBA preempted the liability sections of the Texas law.3 1 However,
in the district court opinion, the anti-retaliation, anti-indemnification,
and independent review sections of the Texas law were held
unconstitutional because they were preempted by ERISA. The plaintiffs
and the defendants filed an appeal challenging the Fifth Circuit district
court's decision.32 Defendant Texas tried unsuccessfully to convince
the Fifth Circuit that Plaintiff Aetna lacked standing to challenge the
new liability sections, which gave Texans the right to sue managed care
organizations for failure to provide reasonable medical treatment
because it had not yet been sued.33 Aetna was able to rebuke Texas'
standing challenge because the new liability section of the law gave the
State Attorney General, as well as private parties, the right to sue Atena
24

CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 530.
1d. at 531.
26
Tax. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001 et seq. (Vernon 2002).
27
CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 531-532 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)).
28
1d. at 531-532 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8901 et seq.).
29
Id.at 532.
30
1d.
25

31

1d

32

CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 532; See Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dept. of
Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
33CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 532.
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if it violated the law. 34 According to the Fifth Circuit, potential
exposure to state regulatory legal liability is enough to establish the
35
required threatening injury for purposes of Article III standing.
Analyzing ERISA's "Relate to" Preemptive Reach
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that from 1974 to 1994 it construed
section 1144(a) of ERISA's "relate to" language in a comprehensive
manner based on its understanding of relevant Supreme Court
precedent about the long reach of ERISA's preemption arm.3 6 The Fifth
Circuit correctly indicated that the Supreme Court, in a trilogy of cases,
rejected the rationale for its comprehensive application of the
preemption rule in ERISA cases. 3 7 The Fifth Circuit suggested
ERISA's extensive use of the preemption rationale was based on the
unacceptable notion that if a state law or policy in any way related to an
employer sponsored benefit it was preempted
because of the relate to
38
11449(a).
§
U.S.C.
29
in
contained
language
In Travelers, the first opinion in a Supreme Court triplet, a New
York law obligated hospitals to collect certain surcharges from HMOs
based on the number of Medicaid recipients they enrolled.39 In
Travelers, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether ERISA
preempts "the state provisions for surcharges on bills of patients whose
commercial insurance coverage is purchased by employee health-care
governed by ERISA, and for surcharges on HMO's insofar as their
membership fees are paid by an ERISA plan." 40 The Court held the
34 CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 532.
35

1d. On the Attorney General's right of action, see TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 §
15(a); TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.47. Relevant provisions imposing liability include
TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 § 2(b)(5) (unfair and deceptive to compel policyholders to

institute suits to recover amounts due); art. 21.21 § 4(10)(ii) (prohibiting the failure to pay
claims when liability has become reasonably clear); Id. at art. 21.21-2(B)(4) (same)." Id. n.6.
36 CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 532.
37
1d. at 532 & n. 8 (citing De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & ClinicalServ's Fund,520 U.S.
806 (1997); CaliforniaDiv. ofLaborStandardsEnforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc.,
519 U.S. 316 (1997); New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
TravelersIns. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995)).
38 CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 532.
39
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S.
at 649.
40
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 649. "New York law also imposes a surcharge on HMO's,
which varies depending on the number of eligible Medicaid recipients an HMO has enrolled,
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surcharges did not relate to an ERISA employee benefit plan as
described in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).41
The Supremacy Clause allows Congress to preempt state law with
express language, by implication or when there is a conflict between
federal and state law. 42 In Travelers, Justice Souter stated the Supreme
Court always engages in the presumption that Congress did not intend
to "supersede the state historic police powers" in the absence of a clear
and manifest statement from Congress that it intended to preempt state
law.43 In Travelers the Supreme Court made it clear that preemption
was a question of Congressional intent. 44 It is now clear that the Court
made a serious error in Shaw45 by giving section 1144(a)'s language
such a broad literal reading that it makes any attempt to evaluate
Congress' preemption intent on simple "relate to" words a "mere
sham., 46 Iu its preemption intent analysis in Travelers, the Supreme
Court abandoned the "uncritical literalism" in interpreting ERISA's
"relate to" words contained in section 1144(a) in favor of considering
Congress' policy goals in enacting the ERISA law.47 The Travelers
Court did what was necessary and proper by asserting that it would no
longer be guided by ERISA's "unhelpful text" in deciding ERISA's
preemptive intent.48 In Travelers the Court concluded that the
objectives of the ERISA law would serve as the best guide for deciding
which set of state laws Congress intended to survive ERISA under 29
U.S.C. 1144(a). 41
i Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, an employee sued his past
employer in a wrongful discharge action. 50 The employee believed he
but which may run as high as 9% of the aggregate monthly charges paid by an HMO for its
members' in-patient hospital care .... This assessment is not an increase in the rates to be paid
by an HMO to hospitals, but a direct payment by the HMO to the State's general fund." Id.at
650.
41Travelers, 514 U.S. at 650.
42
1d. at 654. (cites omitted). The Supremacy Clause is found in the U.S. Const. Art. VI.
43
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 331 U.S. 218, 230

(1947)).
"Id.
45
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-98.
46Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655.
47

1d. at 656.
481d.
49Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656.
50

ngersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (Dec. 1990).
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was unlawfully discharged because his employer did not want to add to
the employee's pension money. The Ingersoll-Rand Court held that
ERISA preempted the employee's wrongful discharge claim under
Texas law.5 1 The Court in Ingersoll-Randidentified the congressional
goal of statute 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) as follows:
"was intended to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be
subject to a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to
minimize the administrative and financial burden of
complying with conflicting directives among States or
between States and the Federal Government. Otherwise, the
inefficiencies created could work to the detriment of plan
beneficiaries. (cites omitted) Allowing state based actions like
the one at issue here would subject plans and plan sponsors to
burdens not unlike those that Congress sought to foreclose
through [29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).] Particularly disruptive is the
potential for conflict in substantive law. It is foreseeable that
state courts, exercising their common law powers, might
develop different substantive standards applicable to the same
employer conduct, requiring the tailoring of plans and
employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each
jurisdiction. Such an outcome is fundamentally at odds with
52
the goal of uniformity that Congress sought to implement.
One could argue that in Ingersoll-Rand, the Court is not really
concerned with the actual affect of the wrongfully discharged Texas
law on ERISA's federal policy interests. 53 In fact Ingersoll-Randstated
it took "for granted that state laws which are 'specifically designed to
affect employee benefit plans' are pre-empted under [29 USC
§1144(a).]" 54 In Travelers, the Court suggested that it would not
virtually automatically preempt "all state laws" affecting employee
benefits "on the theory that they indirectly relate to ERISA plans"
because doing so would allow a limitless long arm of preemption. 55 The
Court's commentary rejected an opportunity to interpret the limiting
language out of section 1144(a)'s preemption theory because it would
51

521d.

53

ngersoll-Rand,498 U.S. at 142.

id.

MId. at 140 (quoting Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Services, Inc. 486 U.S. 825,

829 (1988)).
5
STravelers, 514 U.S. at 661.
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otherwise violate basic principles of statutory interpretation.5 6 The
Travelers Court limited the reach of ERISA's preemption by reasoning
that a state law will not be held to relate to an employee benefit plan for
ERISA preemption purposes unless57 it substantially affects federal
interests in an employee benefit plan.
On April 12, 2001, a federal district court opinion 8 appeared to
give ERISA's preemption a liberal application without identifying a
substantial federal interest requiring preemption. In Brander, the
litigation entailed an argument concerning calculations of the plaintiff's
benefits covered by an ERISA long-term disability policy bought from
the defendant, a life insurance company. 59 The defendant contended
that it was entitled to a summary judgment because the plaintiff's
causes of action were preempted under ERISA ° The defendant
insurance company in Brander maintained that it was entitled to
summary judgment because plaintiff s state law claims were preempted
61
under ERISA because they "relate[d] to" an employee benefit plan.
The plaintiff in Brander cited the Travelers opinion to make a general
policy argument that the Supreme Court rejected the expansive "relate
to" preemptive rationale of ERISA.62
I believe the federal district court in Brander improperly rejected
plaintiff's assertion that Travelers held that any law bearing indirectly
but substantially on an insured benefit plan is preempted under ERISA
because it relates to the employee's benefit plan. 63 If however, the
Branderplaintiff is asserting that "laws that regulate only the insurer, or
the way in which it may sell insurance" do not relate to employee
benefit plans in a normal sense, then the plaintiff has misunderstood the
policy rationale behind the Travelers Court insurance regulation
discussion. 64 The Travelers Court simply articulated that insurance
laws, which do not substantially affect a federal interest in ERISA
56

Id.

57

Id. at 662-664.

58Brander v. UNUM Life, 152 F.Supp.2d.1219 (D. Nev.2001).
'691d. at 1222.

°Od.

61
id.
62

1d. at 1224.
Brander, 152 F.Supp.2d. at 1224 (citing Travelers514 U.S. at 663).
64
Brander, 152 F.Supp.2d. at 1224.
63
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exclusivity "do not relate to benefit plans in the first instance" 65and
therefore,
are not preempted even in the absence of ERISA's Savings
66
Clause.

The Brander holding that the plaintiff's claim is preempted under
ERISA is fatally flawed because the court failed to recognize
Travelers'67 new bright line test for "relate to" claims, namely whether
the employee benefit plan has a substantial effect on an exclusive
federal interest. In Brander, the court placed an undue reliance on the
Shaw court's liberal use of "relate to" to include any benefit plan that
has a plausible connection or reference to such a plan.68 Travelers
modified the Shaw test by stating that a law will be considered as
related to an employee plan if in the pragmatic sense of the phrase it has
a substantial effect on the federal interest in the uniformity of an
interstate benefit. 69 The basic message of Travelers is that indirect
economic influence of a state law that does not substantially effect on
the federal interest in providing uniformity to an employee benefit plan
does not relate to the plan and may not be preempted.7 °
65

Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724,741
(1985)).
66
See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). "Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in
this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which 67
regulates insurance, banking, or securities." Id.
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668.
That said, we do not hold today that ERISA pre-empts only direct
regulation of ERISA plans, nor could we do that with fidelity to the views
expressed in our prior opinions on the matter. We acknowledge that a state
law might produce such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects, by intent or
otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of
substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers, and that
such a state law might indeed be pre-empted under § 514. But as we have
shown, New York's surcharges do not fall into either category; they affect
only indirectly the relative prices of insurance policies, a result no different
from myriad state laws in areas traditionally subject to local regulation,
which Congress could not possibly have intended to eliminate.
Id. (citations
omitted).
63
Brander,152 F.Supp.2d at 1224.
69
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664
7
1d.at 660.
Indeed, to read the pre-emption provision as displacing all state laws
affecting costs and charges on the theory that they indirectly relate to
ERISA plans that purchase insurance policies or HMO memberships that
would cover such services would effectively read the limiting language in S
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In Brander, the federal court correctly stated that the policy
objective of the Supreme Court in Travelers was "avoiding the slippery
slope of applying ERISA preemption to all state regulations that have
71
only an indirect economic effect on an ERISA benefit plan."
Although the Brander Court recognized the policy goals of the
Supreme Court in Travelers of limiting ERISA's preemption in areas
traditionally regulated by the state, Brander failed to clearly apply
Travelers substantive affect on
a federal uniformity preemption test to
72
language.
to"
"relate
ERISA's
I think the federal court in Brander ruled against the plaintiff
because he "[sought] direct enforcement of the provisions of his ERISA
benefit plan, not through ERISA's exclusive enforcement provisions,
but through state causes of action." 73 Under Travelers one could argue
a plaintiff is not required to use ERISA's exclusive enforcement
provisions unless it is first determined that the employee benefit relates
to the plan because it has a substantial 74
effect on a substantive federal
preemptive interest requiring uniformity.
514(a) out of the statute, a conclusion that would violate basic principles of
statutory interpretation and could not be squared with our prior
pronouncement that "[p]re-emption does not occur ... if the state law has
only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral connection with covered plans, as is
the case with many laws of general applicability.
District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S., at 130 n. 1, (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
While Congress's extension of pre-emption to all "state laws relating to
benefit plans" was meant to sweep more broadly than "state laws dealing
with the subject matters covered by ERISA [,] reporting, disclosure,
fiduciary responsibility, and the like," Shaw, 463 U.S., at 98, and n. 19,
nothing in the language of the Act or the context of its passage indicates
that Congress chose to displace general health care regulation, which
historically has been a matter of local concern, see Hillsborough County v.
Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S., at 719; 1 B. Furrow, T.
Greaney, S. Johnson, T. Jost, & R. Schwartz, Health Law §§ 1-6, 1-23
(1995)."
Travelers,
at 661-662.
1
7 Brander,152 F.Supp.2d at 1225.
72
1d. at 1224-1225.
73
1d. at 1225.
74
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668.
[W]e do not hold today that ERISA pre-empts only direct regulation of
ERISA plans, nor could we do that with fidelity to the views expressed in
our prior opinions on the matter. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S., at
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Dillingham Reveals ERISA's "Relate to" Language is Virtually an
Illusory Limit on Preemption
In 1997, two years, after its decision in Travelers, the Supreme Court
revisited the issue of when an employee benefit plan relates to ERISA
for purposes of preemption in the Dillingham75 opinion, the second of a
trilogy.76 In Dillingham, California law obligated an employer hiring
employees on a public works project to pay them the prevailing local
wages. 77 A public works employer was not required to pay prevailing
local wages to employees participating in an authorized apprenticeship
program. 78 The Dillingham Court was asked to decide whether
ERISA's preemption policies under the statute displaced a state
prevailing wage law that forbid a public works employer from paying
apprentice wages to its employees participating in an unauthorized
training program. 79 The Supreme Court held because the state
prevailing wage law did not relate to an employee benefit plan it was
not preempted under ERISA.8 °
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court in Dillingham, had a
difficult time articulating an appropriate limitation for determining
when a state law does not "relate to" an ERISA plan because of the
statutory "relate to" test adopted by the Supreme Court in prior
opinions. 81 It is not logically possible to posit an acceptable limit for
the phrase "relate to" because "everything is related to everything
139; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48, (1987); Shaw,

463 U.S., at 98. We acknowledge that a state law might produce such
acute, albeit indirect, economic effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force
an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or
effectively restrict its choice of insurers, and that such a state law might
indeed be pre-empted under § 514. But as we have shown, New York's
surcharges do not fall into either category; they affect only indirectly the
relative prices of insurance policies, a result no different from myriad state
laws in areas traditionally subject to local regulation, which Congress could
not possibly have intended to eliminate."
Id.
75
Dillingham,519
76

U.S. 316.
CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 532 & n.8.
77
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 319.

78Id.
79

1d. at 319.

sold.
8
Dillingham,519 U.S. at 316-17.
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else.' 8 2 The relate to "statutory text provides an illusory test [for
preemption] unless the Court is willing to decree a degree of
preemption that no sensible person would have intended. 8 3 A futuristic
Court would heed the prophetic warning of Justice Scalia with Justice
Ginsburg concurring that the Court will not bring clarity to the issue of
implied ERISA preemption until
it admits that an expansive "relate to"
84
failure."
to
"doomed
is
theory
In an ERISA disclosure case the Court said "[w]hen a plan
provision as interpreted had the effect of denying an application for
benefits unreasonably, or as it came to be said, arbitrarily and
capriciously, courts would hold that the plan as "structured" was not for
the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees, so that the denial of
benefits violated 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) ' 85 sole benefit requirement. When
'21d.

at 335 (Scalia, J., Ginsburg, J., concurring).

83

1d. at 335-336.
84
1d. at 335.

I think it would greatly assist our function of clarifying the law if we simply
acknowledged that our first take on this statute was wrong; that the "relate
to" clause of the pre-emption provision is meant, not to set forth a test for
pre-emption, but rather to identify the field in which ordinary field preemption applies--namely, the field of laws regulating "employee benefit
plan[s] described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under
section 1003(b) of this title," 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Our new approach to
ERISA pre-emption is set forth in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Harris Trust and Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 99 (1993): "[W]e discern no
solid basis for believing that Congress, when it designed ERISA, intended
fundamentally to alter traditional pre-emption analysis."
I think it
accurately describes our current ERISA jurisprudence to say that we apply
ordinary field pre-emption, and, of course, ordinary conflict pre-emption.
See generally Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)
(explaining general principles of field and conflict pre-emption); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (field pre-emption);
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143
(1963) (conflict preemption). Nothing more mysterious than that; and
except as establishing that, "relates to" is irrelevant."
Id. at 336.
85
Firestone v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,109-110 (1989) (quoting Van Boxel v. Journal Co.
Employers' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048,1052(CA7 1987).). "Firestone maintained an
employee benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq." Id. at 101. "Plaintiffs sued Firestone for severance
benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) and for damages under §§1132(a)(1)(A) and
(c)(1)(B) based on Firestone's breach of its statutory disclosure obligation." Id. (quoting Van
Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Circuit1987) and
(citing See also John A. McCreary, Jr., Comment, The Arbitrary and CapriciousStandard
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ERISA's virtually limitless phrase of "relate to" is used to preempt
states from their role of protecting the health of citizens without a
manifest demonstration of implied preemption,8 6 the relate to phrase
has the effect of unreasonably or arbitrarily violating the states reserve
powers under the Tenth Amendment.8 7 I would argue that using "relate

to" language as a basis for establishing ERISA preemption flunks the
requirement that a decision maker may not implement a law that is
arbitrary because it does not have a reasonably acceptable purpose
under implied preemption.8 8 When a real consequence of the relate to

Under ERISA: Its Origins and Application, 23 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1033, 1037-1039 (1985)).
Id. at 109-1 10.
' 6John A. Chatowski, Notes, Cipollone and the Clear Statement Rule: Doctrinal
Anomaly or New Development in FederalPreemption? 44 SYRACUSE L. REV.769, 772 (1993).
The Supreme Court has delineated three categories of preemption: Express,
implied 'field,' and implied 'conflict' preemption. Express preemption, as
the phrase suggests, occurs when Congress explicitly manifests their intent
to displace state regulation. As the Supreme Court recently explained,
because 'pre-emption fundamentally is a question of congressional intent..
. when Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory
language, the court's task is an easy one.' Absent an express congressional
declaration of intent, two types of implied preemption may be present.
Implied 'field' preemption exists when a scheme of federal regulation is
purported to be so pervasive as to evidence Congress's intent to occupy the
field, or where it is reasonable to conclude that 'Congress left no room for
the States to supplement) the regulation. Implied 'conflict' preemption
exists when either state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution' of Congress's purposes and objectives in enacting
legislation, or when compliance with both federal and state law would be a
'physical impossibility."'
omitted).
Id. (citations
87
U.S. CONST. amend X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." Id.
"Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000).
To be sure, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654-655 (1995), throws some cold
water on the preemption theory; there, we held that, in the field of health
care, a subject of traditional state regulation, there is no ERISA preemption
without clear manifestation of congressional purpose. But in that case the
convergence of state and federal law was not so clear as in the situation we
are positing; the state-law standard had not been subsumed by the standard
to be applied under ERISA. We could struggle with this problem, but first
it is well to ask, again, what would be gained by opening the federal
courthouse doors for a fiduciary malpractice claim, save for possibly
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prerequisite of ERISA denies the states their right to grant their citizens
a right to appeal an HMO's denial of a claim without demonstrating
traditional implied preemption, all an HMO defendant has to do to
acquire federal jurisdiction and federal preemption is simply allege that
the plaintiff's state law complaint is precluded because it relates to an
employee benefit. 89 The McCreary comment points out that the basis
of federal jurisdiction for all ERISA claims is dubious at best. It would
be a tremendous set back to federal and state regulations to expand
ERISA's preemptive reach into health care without a clear statement
from Congress since the health care field has been traditionally
regulated by the states. 90
The irony of the Court's opinion in Dillingham91 is while Justice
Thomas is forced to admit that the Court has "long acknowledged that
ERISA's preemption provision is clearly expansive," 92 he has to engage
in cerebral word structures to limit the unintended wide scope of
ERISA's preemptive impact. In Dillingham, the Court discusses its
two prong study for deciding whether a law is preempted by ERISA's
"relate to" requirement. 93 The Court states a law relates to a covered
benefit plan for purposes of 29 U.S.C. § 11449(a) "if it [1] has a
connection with or [2] reference to such a plan." 94 The reference to test
and the connection to standard for deciding whether a law should be
random fortuities such as more favorable scheduling, or the ancillary
opportunity to seek attorney's fees."
Id.

89
See also McCreary, Jr., Comment, The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard Under
ERISA: Its OriginsandApplication,23 DUQUESNE L. REV. 1033, 1040 (1985)).
It thus became a relatively simple matter for a plaintiff to obtain federal
jurisdiction over his claim of wrongful denial of benefits by asserting only
that he was a participant in the plan and was denied benefits, these
assertions being sufficient to make out a prima facie case of 'structural
defect' in the plan itself. Despite the dubious foundation for the exercise of
federal jurisdiction, the arbitrary and capricious standard, developed by the
cases interpreting it under section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act, has been
expressly adopted as the governing ERISA standard."
Id.
90
Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654-655.
91
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 316.
92
1d. at 324 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655).
93
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 324.
94
1d. (citing District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125,
129 (1992) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)).
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preempted by ERISA are just as illusory as the relate to test it attempts
to give substance to. 95 If "everything is related to everything else," 96 it
is easy to advance the theory that everything is connected with
everything else and that nothing can exist without reference to
something else. Although I believe the reference to inquiry used by
Justice Thomas is not very helpful in deciding when ERISA's 29
U.S.C. 1144(a) preemption applies, I have elected to provide you with
five examples listed by the Court as a basis for ERISA's reference to
preemption.
"[1] we have held pre-empted a law that 'impos[ed]
requirements by reference to [ERISA] covered programs,'; [2]
a law that specifically exempted ERISA plans from an
otherwise generally applicable garnishment provision,); [3]
and a common-law cause of action premised on the existence
of an ERISA plan. [4] Where a State's law acts immediately
and exclusively upon ERISA plans or [5] where the existence
of ERISA plans is essential to the law's operation. [cites
omitted]" 97

A law without any reference to an ERISA plan is preempted if it
shows a "connection with ERISA plans." 98 The Court in Dillingham
stated that to decide whether the state law has a preemptive connection
under ERISA, it has to compare the objectives of the ERISA statute
with Congress' intent not to undermine the traditional scope of state
law while considering "the effect of state law on ERISA plans." 99 I
think it would have been very useful if the Court had followed Justice
Scalia's lead and acknowledged that the "relate to" language and its off
springs, "refer to " and "connect to", are not relevant for deciding
ERISA preemption.'0 0 In the Supreme Court's current ERISA
95
Id. at
96

335 (Scalia, J., Ginsburg, J., concurring).
1d. "But applying the 'relate to' provision according to its terms was a project doomed
to failure, since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to
everything else. Accord, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)." Id.
97

1d. at 324-325.

9
Dillingham,519
99

U.S. at 325.
1d. "Rather, to determine whether a state law has the forbidden connection, we look
both to "the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that
Congress understood would survive, as well as to the nature of the effect of the state law on
ERISA plans. (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658-659.) Id.
00
I at 336. (Scalia, J., Ginsburg, J., concurring).
1d.

DEPAuL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 5: 207

jurisprudence it applies "ordinary field preemption, and of course,
ordinary conflict preemption, according to Justice Scalia."'' 1 The
Supreme Court has provided two common methods for allowing
Congress to preempt laws enacted by the state.10 2 If Congress signals
intent to occupy a specific field, all state laws within the scope of the
field are preempted.10 3 When Congress fails to completely replace state
law in a field, state laws are preempted if they in fact conflict with
federal law.10 4 A conflict for preemption purposes exists if it is
impossible to comply with both state and federal legal requirements. 0 5
State law also creates a preemptive conflict if it impairs the goals of
Congress.' 0 6 In Dillingham, a simple traditional preemption analysis
without any reference to the "relate to" language reveals that
preemption is not necessary because Congress did not signal an intent
under ERISA to occupy the entire field of "state apprenticeship
training standards or state prevailing wage laws.' 1 7 A state law
requiring employers working on public projects to pay wages equal to
that paid for similar projects in the local community in the private
sector does not conflict with federal law because the state law is
following the federal example.' 0 8 It is not impossible for a California
101ld. (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-Mcgee Corp. 464 U.S. 238 (1984)).
102Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
'03Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 203-04. "Absent explicit preemptive language, Congress'
intent to supercede state law altogether may be found from a 'scheme of federal regulation so

pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to supplement it,'
because 'the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,'
or because 'the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations
imposed
by it may reveal the same purpose."' Id.
104Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, (1963). "The

test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give
way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence
of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives." Id. at 142.
'O1'd. at 142-43.
106Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The Supreme Court's "primary function
is to determine whether, under the circumstances of [a] particular case, ...[a state law] stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."
Id.
10
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 331.

'05ld. at 319.
Since 1931, the Davis-Bacon Act, 46 Stat. 1494, as amended, 40 U.S.C. §§
276a to 276a-5, has required that the wages paid on federal public works
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public contractor to comply with a state law that is not remotely
connected to "the areas with which ERISA is expressly concerned-"reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility and the like."1' 9 If the
Dillingham Court had held California's prevailing wage and
apprenticeship training laws were preempted under ERISA, it would
have been an improper use of preemption because the Court's decision,
rather than state law, impairs federal policy by denying a state the
ability to implement an express federal policy.1 0 Under a clearly
articulated traditional implied preemption analysis, Dillingham would
have avoided any discussion of ERISA's "relate to" language 11 and
held California's prevailing wage laws and apprenticeship standards
neither conflicted with federal policy nor impaired federal objectives
under ERISA as they were not preemptive employee benefits plans.

projects equal wages paid in the project's locale on similar, private
construction jobs. California, in 1937, adopted a similar statute, which
requires contractors who are awarded public works projects to pay their
workers 'not less than the general prevailing rate of per diem wages for
work of a similar character in the locality in which the public work is
performed.' Under both the Davis-Bacon Act and California's prevailing
wage law, public works contractors may pay less than the prevailing
journeyman wage to apprentices in apprenticeship programs that meet
standards promulgated under the National Apprenticeship Act, 50 Stat.
664, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 50 (known popularly as the Fitzgerald Act).
In most circumstances, California public works contractors are not obliged
to employ apprentices, but if they do, the apprentice wage is only permitted
for those apprentices in approved programs.
Id. at 319-320.
'O1'd. at 330 (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661, (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98)).
1od. at 331 & n.7. "Were we to hold § 1777.5 preempted "[t]hat result 'would leave
States without the authority to do just what Congress was expressly trying to induce them to do
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22 (internal
by enacting the Fitzgerald Act.'
quotation marks and brackets omitted)." Id.
.. Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 331. "We could not hold pre-empted a state law in an area of
traditional state regulation based on so tenuous a relation without doing grave violence to our
presumption that Congress intended nothing of the sort. We thus conclude that California's
prevailing wage laws and apprenticeship standards do not have a "connection with," and
therefore do not "relate to," ERISA plans." Id. at n.7.
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In De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & ClinicalServices Fund
ERISA's "Relate To" Language is Evaluated Under the Normal
Presumption Against Preemption
On June 2, 1997, the Supreme Court decided an ERISA preemption
issue in the De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Services
Fund12 opinion, the last one of a trilogy. This decision came after the
Supreme Court had decided a similar preemption issue less than four
months earlier in Dillingham.1 13 In De Buono, the Court held that
hospitals handled by ERISA's had the same tax liability as other
similarly situated hospitals.1 14 The Court in De Buno characterized the
narrow legal issue in the case as a question of whether "the opaque
language in ERISA's §514(a) precludes New York from imposing a
gross receipts tax on the income of medical centers operated by ERISA
funds." 115 The Court held that ERISA's blurred "relate to" language
under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
would not preclude the state of New York
116
tax.
its
collecting
from
The New York General Assembly enacted tax legislation to
produce more money for a state Medicaid program that was quickly
running out of money.117 The new'tax legislation called, Health Facility
Assessment (HFA), 1 8 required hospitals, residential health care
facilities, and diagnostic treatment centers to pay a tax on all the gross
receipts produced by patient services. Any money collected under HFA
was deposited into New York's general revenue fund." 9 The plaintiffs
were trustees of a fund that managed a self-insured welfare benefit plan
for several employers.' 20 Initially the plaintiffs paid the HFA tax, but
they stopped paying the tax and filed suit to prohibit future assessments
12 1
and to seek reimbursement for all the previously paid assessments.
The plaintiff's cause of action stated that because the HFA law relates
n 2De Buono, 520 U.S. 806.
"3 Dillingham,519 U.S. 316.
'145 De Buono, 520 U.S. at 809.
1

Id.

116Id.

"7Id.at 809-8 10.

18 1d. & n. 3 (citing N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-d (McKinney Supp.1992)).

119
De Buono, 520 U.S. at 810.
20

De Buono, 520 U.S. at 810.

1211d.
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to the fund under ERISA's 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) language HFA is
preempted.1 22 The trial court rejected the plaintiffs claim of ERISA
a general tax with an incidental impact
preemption because HFA was
23
plan.
benefit
employee
an
on
The decision of the trial court was reversed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 124 The Second Circuit
believed HFA related to the fund since IFA "reduced the amount of
Fund assets that would otherwise be available to provide plan members
with benefits, and could cause the plan to limit its benefits, or to charge
plan members higher fees.' 25 In De Buno, the Supreme Court
appropriately reversed the holding that I-iFA was preempted because the
Second Circuit erred by improperly relying "substantially on an
expansive and literal interpretation of the words relate to under 29
U.S.C.C. § 1144(a).' 26 By not adopting Travelers rejection of a
strictly literal reading of 29 U.S.C.C. § 1144(a) and its virtually
the phrase "relate to" the Second
limitless expansive construction of
1 27
error.
reversible
committed
Circuit
.id.
I3Id.
124DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 811.

"2Id.at 812.
The first petition for certiorari in this case was filed before we handed
down our opinion in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995). In that case we
held that ERISA did not pre-empt a New York statute that required
hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered by a commercial
insurer but not from patients insured by a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan. Id.
at 649-651. After deciding Travelers, we vacated the judgment of the Court
of Appeals in this case and remanded for further consideration in light of
that opinion. 514 U.S. 1094 (1995). On remand the Court of Appeals
The court distinguished the statute
reinstated its original judgment.
involved in Travelers on the ground that-by imposing a tax on the health
insurance carriers who provided coverage to plans and their beneficiariesit had only an indirect economic influence on the decisions of ERISA plan
administrators, whereas the HFA 'depletes the Fund's assets directly, and
thus has an immediate impact on the operations of an ERISA plan,' NYSAILA Medical and ClinicalServices Fund v. Axelrod, M. D., 74 F.3d 28, 30
(1996). We granted the New York officials' second petition for certiorari,
519 U.S. 926 (1996), and now reverse.
Id.
12
6De Buono 520 U.S. at 812-813.
127Id. at 813.
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In De Buono the Supreme Court acknowledged that it was not
necessarily relying on an expansive interpretation of ERISA's relate to
language in its early preemption cases because the state law in previous
opinions presented an unclouded "connection with or reference to
ERISA Benefits plans. 128
Although the De Buono 1 29 Court suggests that the Supreme Court
did not rely on an expansive and literal interpretation of "relate to" in
Shaw,130 I disagree with the Court because, in a literal sense, the
phrases a "connection with" or "reference to" is the functional
equivalent of the "relate to" language. 131 All three phrases, "connected
with", "reference to", and "related to" are fatally flawed attempts to
limit ERISA's preemption because omnipresent connections and
infinite references "like universal relations stop nowhere."' 132 The
Court in De Buono,133 citing Travelers,134 wisely conceded that
ERISA's expansive "relate to" language did not alter the established
presumption that in the absence of explicit language to that effect or
135
conflict with goals "Congress does not intend to supplant state law."'
I believe the "connected with" and "reference to" language is just as
problematic as the phrase "relate to" for ERISA preemption purposes
and as a result all three phrases fail to overcome the presumption
against preemption.
In order to overcome the normal presumption against preemption
in ERISA cases, the Supreme Court should abandon its "connected to"
test and its "reference to" experiment and return to its traditional field
and conflict preemption analysis as strongly recommended by Justices

1281d. at 813 (citing Shaw,supra note 4 at 96-97).
129

1d.

1301d. at 813 (citing Shaw,supra note 4 at 96-97.)
'Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97. "A law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal
sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." Id. at 96-97 (citing
and Black's Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary "'Relate. To
stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association
with or 32connection with')) Id. at n. 16.
De Buono, 520 U.S. at 813 (quoting H. James, Roderick Hudson xli (New York ed.,
World's Classics 1980)).

"3431d. at 813.

1 De Buono, 520 U.S. at 813.
1351d. (citing Travelers 514 U.S. at 654.)
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Scalia and Ginsburg in Dillingham.136 The Court concludes that HFA is
not preempted because it "is one of 'myriad state laws' of general
applicability that impose some burdens on the administration of ERISA
plans but nevertheless do not 'relate to' them within the meaning of the
governing statute."'137 Under a traditional preemption analysis, the
Supreme Court could simply find that HFA is not preempted because
there is insufficient evidence since Congress intended to prohibit the
HFA, a tax revenue, from operation in the field where hospitals are
regulated.138 Under traditional conflict preemption, the Court could
candidly hold that IFA is preempted because it does not conflict with
any of the goals of the ERISA law. 139 From a conflict preemption
perspective, HFA is one of a "myriad state laws of general applicability
that impose burdens on the administration of general applicability that
impose burdens on the administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless
do not' 140 require either conflict preemption or field preemption
because they do not have any substantial effect on any relevant federal
policy. In my opinion, the HFA is a hospital tax that does not relate to
ERISA for preemption purposes because it does not have any
interest to overthrow the normal
substantial effect on any federal
141
preemption.
against
presumption

36

' Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 336 (Scalia, J., Ginsburg, J., concurring).

137 DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 816.

38
' Id. at 814-15.
139Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963)
(conflict preemption). "A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires
no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both federal and state regulations
is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce." Id. (citing ef. Union Bridge
Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 399-401; Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373; Bibb v.
Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520).
Navajo Freight
140De Buono, 520 U.S. at 815-16. "A consideration of the actual operation of the state
statute leads us to the conclusion that the HFA is one of "myriad state laws" of general
applicability that impose some burdens on the administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless
do not "relate to" them within the meaning of the governing statute. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at
668; Dillingham 519 U.S. at 333-334." Id.
141Id. at 816. "Any state tax, or other law, that increases the cost of providing benefits to
covered employees will have some effect on the administration of ERISA plans, but that simply
cannot mean that every state law with such an effect is pre-empted by the federal statute." Id.
"As we acknowledged in Travelers, there might be a state law whose economic effects,
intentionally or otherwise, were so acute 'as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme
of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers' and such a state law 'might
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An Analysis of the Fifth Circuit's Approach to the ERISA Trilogy
in CorporateHealth Insurance
The Fifth Circuit's major premise about the Supreme Court's ERISA
trilogy of Travelers, Dillingham, and De Buono is imperfect because it
is a highly debatable legal theory for that court to conclude that the
trilogy represents a return to traditional preemption analysis. 142 For
example, in Dillingham, Justice Scalia in a concurring opinion with
Justice Ginsburg, stated they believed the Court had abandoned its
"relate to" preemption jurisprudence and returned to general rules of
field and conflict preemption. 143 While attempting to narrow the scope
of ERISA's relate to preemption rationale, 144 the Supreme Court never
expressly rejected its "relate to" preemption in ERISA cases and
returned to traditional field/conflict analysis of preemption in all cases
impacting employee benefit plans under 29 U.S.C § 1144(a). Unlike the
Fifth Circuit, I believe in the trilogy 145 where the Supreme Court
expressly resolved whether federal policy interests preempted state law
for ERISA purposes by its "relate to" "connect with" "reference to"
theory of preemption rather than stating an unequivocal return to
traditional implied field/conflict preemption.
This discussion will limit its analysis of ERISA's "relate to"
preemption rationale to the Texas "statute's independent review of
determinations"' 146 by HMOs to deny a request for treatment as not
medically necessary. The Texas code gives one the right to an
independent review of an HMO claim denial in different code
sections. 147 Under the Texas civil code patients are required to follow
an independent review process before they are permitted to sue an
I-MO in court. 148 The Texas civil code "allows independent review
only of claims for which patients may bring suit under the liability

indeed be pre-empted under § 514,' [Travelers,] 514 U.S. at 668. That is not the case here."
Id. at n.14216.
CorporateHealth,215 F.3d 526.
43
' Dillingham 519 U.S. at 336.
144De Buono, 520 U.S. 806.
145 Travelers,514 U.S. 645, Dillingham,519 U.S. 316, De Buono, 520 U.S. 806.
146CorporateHealth 215 F3d. at 536.
14
71d.
1481d. (citing see TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.003 (Vernon's 2002)).
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provisions. As such, the review provisions are not preempted. 149 The
Fifth Circuit was of the opinion that since the independent review of
HMO claim denials under the Texas civil code statute was voluntary for
that the review provision
an HMO, an H-!MO is precluded from alleging
150
"is at odds with its duties under ERISA.'
In its insurance code Texas law provides a much more liberal
independent review procedure. 151 The Texas Insurance Code permits
patients to appeal "adverse determinations."' 152 An adverse
determination under the insurance code was described by the court as
"[A] determination by [an HMO] or utilization review agent that the
health care services furnished or proposed to be furnished to an enrollee
are not medically necessary or are not appropriate." 153 Under the
provisions of the Texas Insurance Code, it is mandatory for the
utilization review agent to follow the "independent review
organization's determination of medical necessity., 154 The Fifth Circuit
concluded that granting a patient the right to appeal a denial of
coverage by an HMO to an independent party is preempted under
ERISA. 155 "Such an attempt to impose a state administrative regime
is squarely within the ambit of
governing coverage determinations
1 56
reach.'
preemptive
ERISA's
The Fifth Circuit rejected the position that the mandatory
provision of the Texas independent review law was saved from ERISA
49

1

1d.

"Ol1d. at 536-37 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 88.003(a) and (c)).
5
5'Corporate Health 215 F3d. at 537. (citing See TEX. INS. CODE art. 20A.09(e)
(codified in 1997 at 20A.09(a)(3)) and 20A.12A (amendments to the Texas Health
Maintenance Organization Act); 21.58A § 6(b) and (c) and § 6A (amendments to the
Review Agent Act).). Id. at n.38.
Utilization
5

1 21d.

153 Corporate Health 215 F3d. at 537. (citing TEx. INS. CODE art. 20A.12A(a)(1)
(codified in 1997 in slightly amended form at 20A.12(c)(1)).
15 Id. (citing TEx. INS. CODE art Art. 21.58A § 6A(3)). "The provision refers specifically
to 'utilization review agents' for insurers and administrators. HMOs are directed to follow the
rules applicable to utilization review agents." Id. at n.40.
15 d.
156Id. "This preemption does not reach three provisions of the Act codified in the
Insurance Code which do not create a right to independent review: Tex. Ins. Code art. 21.58C
(setting forth general standards and rules for independent review organizations); 21.58A § 8(f)
(confidentiality provision); and 20A.12(a) and (b) (making minor changes to preexisting
provision)" Id. at n. 42.
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preemption under the savings clause. 5 7 One major federal goal of the
savings clause is to allow the states to continue to regulate the
insurance industry under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 158 Under the
Fifth Circuit's analysis, the Texas law providing for independent
review of an HMO's medical necessity decision is an exception to
ERISA's savings clause because otherwise saved provisions are
5 9
preempted if they "conflict with a substantive provision of ERISA.5'1
Although the Fifth Circuit appears to concede that the Texas
independent review law does not create a substantive cause of action
for patients, it unfortunately applies Pilot Life's expansive "relate to"
157

1d. at 539.
158Corporate Health 215 F3d. at 537. The McCarran-Ferguson Act states, in pertinent
part: "The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws
of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business." 15 U.S.C. §
1012(a).
1591d. at 538. (quoting Pilot Life v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987)).
In the present case, moreover, we are obliged in interpreting the saving
clause to consider not only the factors by which we were guided in
Metropolitan Life, but also the role of the saving clause in ERISA as a
whole. On numerous occasions we have noted that '[i]n expounding a
statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and
policy."' Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986), quoting Offshore
Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 221 (1986) (quoting Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956) (in turn quoting United
States v. Heirs ofBoisdore, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849))). Because in this
case, the state cause of action seeks remedies for the improper processing
of a claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan, our understanding
of the saving clause must be informed by the legislative intent concerning
the civil enforcement provisions provided by ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. S
1132(a). The Solicitor General, for the United States as amicus curiae,
argues that Congress clearly expressed an intent that the civil enforcement
provisions of ERISA § 502(a) be the exclusive vehicle for actions by
ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper processing of
a claim for benefits, and that varying state causes of action for claims
within the scope of § 502(a) would pose an obstacle to the purposes and
objectives of Congress. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18-19.
We agree. The conclusion that § 502(a) was intended to be exclusive is
supported, first, by the language and structure of the civil enforcement
provisions, and second, by legislative history in which Congress declared
that the pre-emptive force of § 502(a) was modeled on the exclusive
remedy provided by S 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947
(LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185."
Id. at 51-52.
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ERISA preemptive rationale to the procedural review issue presented in
Corporate Health Insurance.16 The Court in Pilot Life stated "that
state laws related to ERISA may also fall under the saving clause--was
not focused on any particular relationship or conflict between a
substantive provision of ERISA and a state law."' 61 The Fifth Circuit's
reliance on Pilot Life to support an ERISA "relate to" conflict based
preemption is misplaced because the Court in Pilot Life refused to
apply ERISA's savings clause to an employee's common law tort and
contract claims because those claims simply did not regulate insurance
under Mississippi law. 162 In PilotLife, the Supreme Court did not apply
ERISA savings clause because of the common sense understanding of
the "McCarran-Ferguson Act factors defining the business of
insurance" since Mississippi was not regulating insurance when it
recognized the plaintiff-employee's cause of action. 163
The Fifth
Circuit rejected the Texas independent review procedure as an
unacceptable alternative mechanism because it gave the employees
the
164
ERISA.
of
1132(a)(1)(B)
§
29
under
offered
relief
identical
The Fifth Circuit's analysis is problematic because ERISA's
exclusive enforcement remedy fails to provide any substantive
protection for employee health benefit because Congress did not intend
to allow ERISA's relate to rationale to preempt a state's traditional role
of regulating employee health benefits in the absence of traditional
conflict preemption. 165 As Justice Scalia stated in a concurring opinion
in Dillingham that ERISA's "relate to" rationale was not properly
understood as a "test for preemption" but the "relate to" threshold was a
160CorporateHealth, 215 F.3 at 539.
6t

1 PilotLife v.Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987).
62
1 1d. at 49. "In the present case, the considerations weighed in MetropolitanLife argue
against the assertion that the Mississippi law of bad faith is a state law that 'regulates
insurance.' As early as 1915 the Mississippi Supreme Court had recognized that punitive
damages were available in a contract case when 'the act or omission constituting the breach of
the contract amounts also to the commission of a tort.' See Hood v. Moffett, 109 Miss. 757,
767, 69 So. 664, 666 (1915) (involving a physician's breach of a contract to attend to a woman
at her approaching
'accouchement')." Id.
1631d.at 57.
'54See 29 § 1132(a)(1)(B). "A civil action may be brought--by a beneficiary- for the
relief to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan...."
16D'illingham, 519 U.S. at 336 (Scalia, J.,
Ginsburg, J.concurring); See 29 U.S.C. §
1132 to review ERISA enforcement process.
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starting point for identifying traditional field/conflict preemption. 166
The Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the Texas "independent review
provisions conflict with ERISA's exclusive remedy and cannot be
saved by the saving clause" is not based on solid analysis because of the
Fifth Circuit's failure to adequately demonstrate that it was applying
traditional conflict preemption principles recommended by Justice
Scalia. 167 The Fifth Circuit's ERISA conflict rationale is not
sufficiently supported by its conclusion that the savings clause in Pilot
Life "[did] not operate if the state law at issue creates an alternative
remedy for obtaining benefits under ERISA.', 168 Unlike the Fifth
Circuit, I think the rationale for the Court's holding in PilotLife is the
simple fact that ERISA's savings clause was not triggered in Pilot Life
because Mississippi was not regulating insurance. 169 It is conceded that

the alternative remedy served as a basis for ERISA preemption in Pilot
Life, since the alternate remedy issue was not relevant to the savings
clause exception to preemption once the Court determined that the state
70
of Mississippi was not regulating insurance. 1
A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION
IN MORAN V R USHPRUDENTIAL HMO, INC.
Facts
In Moran v. Rush Prudential,171 and under the Illinois HMO Act, 17 2 an

HIO must comply with a patient's request for "an independent
physician review when there is a disagreement over whether a course of
treatment is medically necessary between a patient's primary care
physician and the HIO.' 173 If the independent reviewer concludes that

the treatment is necessary, the HMO is obligated to pay for the

'6MId. at 336 (Scalia, J., Ginsburg, J. concurring).

167id.
16

CorporateHealth, 215 F.3d at 539.
' PilotLife, 481 U.S. at 49.
69

170
1d.
71

at 41.
1 Moran, 230 F.3d at 962.
1721d. (citing Section 4-10 of Illinois' Health Maintenance Organization Act ("the HMO
Act"), 215
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/1-1 et seq.,).
173Id.
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treatment under the Illinois HIMO Act.174 Debra Moran, the
plaintiff/appellant was insured by a medical benefits plan offered by her
spouse's employer.1 5 Her rights under the fully insured health care plan
Rush, the
presented issues to be decided under ERISA. 176
defendant/appellee was the HMO provider for this employee benefit
plan. 177 The plan granted Rush "the broadest possible discretion...to
determine which benefits the participants are entitled to receive., 178
The plan's member certificate informed those insured under the plan
that Rush would not pay for those treatments deemed, not "medically
79

necessary". 1

Ms. Moran's primary care doctor and a Rush-affiliated physician,
Dr. Arthur LaMarre, requested that Rush authorize Dr. Terzis, an out of
the network surgeon, to perform microneurolysis surgery on Ms.
Moran. 180 In a letter, Dr. LaMarre advised Rush that his patient, Ms.
Moran, would be "best served" by having Dr. Terzis perform a
complicated microneurolysis surgery. 181 Rush rejected Dr. LaMarre's
advice for his patient and denied coverage for the microneurolysis
82
surgery.1
In a letter to Ms. Moran, Rush responded that its reasons for
denying coverage for Dr. Terzis' proposed surgery was because it was
not medically necessary under the plan. 183 After denying coverage for
the proposed microneurolysis surgery, Rush further responded that it
would only cover the standard, less complicated, TOS surgery by a
network surgeon.' 8 4 After rejecting Rush's offer for the standard
surgery, Ms. Moran presented an appeal to Rush's Membership
Advisory Committee that was unsuccessful because the committee
affirmed Rush's denial of her claim.' 85 "In February 1998, Dr. Terzis
174Id.
7

1 5d

'76Moran, 230 F.3d at 962.
177Id.

17Sd.
179Id
"lS°d. at 963.
""1Moran,230 F.3d at 963
3

" 1d. at

963-64.

'"'Moran, 230 F.3d at 964.
1851d.
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performed the microneurolysis surgery on Ms. Moran. The surgery
took nearly 14 hours with a postoperative
care cost of $94,841.27. Ms.
86
Moran paid for the surgery herself."'
In January 1998, prior to her microneurolysis surgery, Ms. Moran
asked Rush to adhere to the requirements of § 4-10 of the HMO Act.
Section 4-10 of the HMO Act requires the HMO to establish a
procedure "for a review by an independent physician when the patient's
primary care physician and HMO disagree about the medical necessity
of a treatment proposed by the primary care physician."' 8 7 Under
Section 4-10 of the HMO Act an LIMO is obligated to provide the
proposed treatment if the reviewing physician determines that the
proposed treatment is medically necessary. 8 After Rush failed to act
on Ms. Moran's request for it to obey the requirements of section 4-10
of the HMO Act she filed a complaint in Illinois circuit court requesting
an independent physician
to review the denial of her claim for
89
microneurolysis surgery.1
Rush was successful in having Ms. Moran's state court claim for
independent review removed to federal district court on an ERISA
preemption theory. 190 Following extended procedural litigation, as well
as a remand to state court and another removal by Rush, the district
court granted summary judgment to Rush. 191 The district court decided
that Ms. Moran's § 4-10 claim of the HMO Act was preempted by
ERISA. 192 The federal district court affirmed Rush's decision to deny
Ms. Moran request for the microneurolysis surgery. 193 Ms. Moran filed
an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit to challenge the decision of the district court.' 94 The Seventh
195
Circuit reversed.

86
1

Id.

87
d. (see 215
188
rd"
fI

ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-10).

'Moran, 230 F.3d at 964.

1901d.
' 911d. at 964-66
' 92 1d. at 965
' 931d. at 966
' 9954 Moran, 230 F.3d at 959.
1

Id.
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Brief Analysis of the Right to Independent Review and ERISA's
Saving Clause
The Seventh Circuit uses the 29 U.S.C. §1144(a) "relate to" theory to
decide whether § 4-10 of the Illinois HMO Act is preempted. 196 Under
the relate to preemption theory, the Seventh Circuit concludes that § 410 of the IMO "relates to" ERISA plans because its provisions have a
connection with such plans."' 197 Because § 4-10 of the Illinois HMO
Act creates uncertainty for ERISA plan administrators about possible
conflicting state legal requirements, the IMO Act is connected with the
ERISA plan.198 Any state law that is connected to an ERISA plan is
automatically deemed to relate to the plan based on 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
preemption rationale.1 99 Under § 4-10 all IMOs are required to furnish
an independent review process and to pay a disputed claim if the
independent reviewer agrees with the primary care physician's
determination that the procedure is medically necessary.210 Since § 4-10
of the HMO Act dictates that an IMO provide an employee a benefit of
195

Id. at 968.
. 97Moran,230 F.3d at 959.
To determine whether § 4-10 of the HMO Act 'relates to' ERISA plans, we
begin by looking at the state statute. Section 4-10 provides, in relevant

part: Each Health Maintenance Organization shall provide a mechanism for
the timely review by a physician holding the same class of license as the
primary care physician, who is unaffiliated with the Health Maintenance
Organization, jointly selected by the patient (or the patient's next of kin or
legal representative if the patient is unable to act for himself), primary care
physician and the Health Maintenance Organization in the event of a
dispute between the primary care physician and the Health Maintenance
Organization regarding the medical necessity of a covered service proposed
by a primary care physician. In the event that the reviewing physician
determines the covered service to be medically necessary, the Health
Maintenance Organization shall provide the covered service. 215 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-10. From the text of the HMO Act it is
apparent that the law does not make 'reference to' an ERISA-govemed
employee benefit plan; no mention is made of ERISA plans, and the law
applies to HMOs regardless of whether a patient's coverage is through an
ERISA plan. Cf Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656 (noting that the law in
question in that case did not make 'reference to' ERISA plans because the
law's provisions applied regardless of whether the coverage was 'secured
by an ERISA plan, private purchase, or otherwise').
Id.

19
'1d.
199

at 968-969. (citing FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 59 (1990).
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 324.
21°Moran, 230 F.3d at 969.
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independent
review, it is in reach of ERISA's relate to preemption
20 1
theory.
In UNUM Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, the plaintiff John E. Ward
filed suit because he was denied disability benefits under an insurance
policy controlled by ERISA and issued by defendant UNUM Life
Insurance Company of America (UNUM). 2 °2 Because Plaintiff Ward
sent proof of his claim to UNUM after the time limit set in the policy
had expired the defendant UNUM rejected his claim. 203 In Ward the
California's "notice-prejudice" rule stated that an insurer cannot avoid
liability simply by proof of an untimely claim unless the insurer
demonstrates that it was prejudiced by the delay.2 0 4 The Supreme
Court in Ward held that California's notice-prejudice rule was saved
from ERISA preemption because under California law the noticeprejudice rule was a regulation of insurance. 20 5 The Seventh Circuit
relying on Ward held that a state law that "relates to" an ERISA plan
may avoid preemption provided that the law regulates insurance as
defined in ERISA's savings clause, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). 206 After
evaluating the three McCarran-Ferguson factors the Seventh Circuit
concluded § 4-10 qualified for the ERISA savings clause because it
regulated insurance based on a common sense application of the

201
2 21d.

0 LUUM v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358,363 (1999)

203
2 Id. at

363.
04Id. at 364 (quoting Ward v. Management Analysis Co. Employee Disability Benefit
Plan, 135 F.3d 1275,1280 (1998)).
205
d.
2
°rMoran,230 F.3d at 969.
To determine whether a state law 'regulates insurance' within the meaning
of the saving clause, we first ask 'whether, from a "common-sense view of
the matter," the contested prescription regulates insurance.' Next, we
consider 'three factors employed to determine whether the regulation fits
within the "business of insurance" as that phrase is used in the McCarranFerguson Act.' Of these three factors, the first is 'whether the practice has
the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk.' The second
factor is 'whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship
between the insurer and the insured.' And the third is 'whether the practice
is limited to entities within the insurance industry.' A state law may fall
within the saving clause even if it cannot satisfy all three of the McCarran-

Ferguson factors."
Id. at 969. (citations omitted).

2002]

HMOS, ERISA 'S "RELATE TO" PREEMPTIONAND A PATIENT'S RIGHT

239

relevant factors. 20 7 Section 4-10 of the HMO Act meets two McCarranFerguson factors because under Illinois law the HMO Act is (1) 2an
08
"integral part" of the relationship between the insured and insurer,
insurance industry because it
and (2) the law is said to be limited to the
2 9
0
insurers.
as
acting
only applies to HIMOs
Brief Discussion of When ERISA's Saving Clause Fails to Save a
State Law from Preemption
Although § 4-10 of the HMO Act as an insurance regulation would
normally be protected by ERISA's saving clause the Act is subject to
preemption if the law conflicts with a substantive provision of
ERISA.2 1 0 Rush tried unsuccessfully to convince the Seventh Circuit
that § 4-10 of the Illinois LIMO Act was preempted because it
conflicted with 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) civil enforcement scheme.2 n
The Seventh Circuit agreed with Rush that the Fifth Circuit recently
analyzed "an independent review statute from Texas that is quite
similar to § 4-10 of the Illinois' HMO Act."'212 The Fifth and Seventh
207

Moran, 230 F.3d at 969.
8M.
'It is fundamental insurance law that "existing and valid statutory
provisions enter into and form a part of all contracts of insurance to which
they are applicable, and, together with settled judicial constructions thereof,
become a part of the contract as much as if they were actually incorporated
therein."' Plumb, 124 F.3d at 861 (quoting 2 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F.
Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3d § 19:1, at 19-2 to 19- 4 (1996)). The
provisions of § 4-10 of the HMO Act, therefore, are substantive terms of all
insurance policies in Illinois by operation of law. When a law mandates a
contract term between parties, whether that term is characterized as creating
a 'procedural' or 'substantive' right, that law is 'integral' to the
insurer/insured relationship."
Id. at 969.
29
" d. at 969.
210
1d. at 970 (citingPilotLife, 481 U.S. at 157.)
21
20

lid.
2 Moran, 230 F.3d at 970.

The Texas independent review statute, like§ 4-10 of the HMO Act,
essentially 'allow[s] a patient who has been denied coverage to appeal to an
outside organization.' Id. at 537. The law requires IlMOs to provide a
mechanism for patients to obtain an independent review of the need for a
course of treatment. Specifically, the court explained, the Texas statute
states that patients may appeal 'adverse determinations,' which are defined
as determinations that a health care service is not 'medically necessary' or
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Circuits drew very different conclusions about a patient's right to
independent review under comparable statutes. 213 The Seventh Circuit
believed the Fifth Circuit's rationale for holding that the Texas
independent review law was preempted because the law created an
impermissible alternative state remedy for enforcing ERISA plan
benefits that conflicted with ERISA's exclusive federal remedy under
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) for enforcing ERISA plan benefits. 214 Their
colleagues in the Fifth Circuit apparently believed that the Texas
independent review law was a state regime for reviewing ERISA plan
benefits claims on the issue of medical necessity and not a plan for
establishing the required terms of an insurance contract, according to
215
the Seventh Circuit.
After discussing the Fifth Circuit's approach to the Texas
independent review law, the Seventh Circuit stated "§ 4-10 of the
Illinois HMO Act cannot be characterized as creating an alternative
remedy scheme that conflicts with § 502(a). The independent review
scheme created by the Illinois statute is not tantamount to the relief
offered under § 502(a)(1)(B). ... [T]he provisions of § 4-10 of the HMO
Act have been incorporated into Ms. Moran's insurance contract., 216 In
my opinion the Seventh Circuit is correct in stating the purpose of § 410 of the HMO Act is not to conflict with federal policy of an exclusive
federal ERISA remedy.217 Section 4-10 candidly requires each HMO in
Illinois218 regulated by insurance under the McCarran-Ferguson
factors 219 to give each patient the substantive right to an independent
review on the issue of medical necessity when there is a dispute
'appropriate,' to an independent reviewer. Id. (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Moreover, under the Texas statute, the HMO must
'comply' with the independent reviewer's determination of medical
necessity. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted)."
Id. at 970-71.
213
214Moran, 230 F.3d at 971.
1d.
215
1d. (citing Corporate Health Ins., Co. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 220 F.3d 641, 644 (5th
Cir.2000)
(petition for rehearing denied at 220 F.3d. 644).
21 Id.

at 971.

2 17

Id.

218215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/1-1 et seq.).

Section 4-10 of Illinois' Health

Maintenance
Organization Act ("the HMO Act").
219
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985). Whether,
from a "common-sense view of the matter," the contested prescription regulates insurance. Id.
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between the primary care physician and the patient's HMO. 220 Ms.
Moran's lawsuit should not be preempted on the procedural
misunderstanding that she is seeking to enforce a substantive right
different from that provided under ERISA's enforcement provisions.22 '
Ms. Moran's lawsuit properly understood is simply a painful attempt
under ERISA's
"to enforce rights" and "to recover benefits" 222
1132(a)(1)(B).
§
U.S.C.
29
of
enforcement provisions
The Seventh Circuit's analysis of the relevant Supreme Court
precedent support its conclusion that § 4-10 of the HMO Act is an
insurance contract requirement for HMOs providing insurance benefits
in Illinois and is saved from ERISA preemption because the HMO Act
224
regulates insurance.2 23 The Supreme Court's decision in Pilot Life
does not apply to the Illinois HMO law because unlike the Mississippi
law that did not regulate insurance the Illinois law actually regulates
insurance. 225 It is precisely because HMOs like Rush desire to act as
unregulated insurers when they deny their patients the right to an
independent review of an insurance benefit deemed medically necessary
that Rush has challenged the HMO Act. 226 Ms. Moran is simply
fighting with Rush, an insurance company, about a denied insurance
benefit sponsored by her employer. The power reserved to the states
under the Tenth Amendment2 2 7 allows Illinois to grant its insured
citizen employees a right to have an internal dispute concerning
the HMO's physician,
medical necessity between the 11MG and
228
resolved by an independent medical expert.

220

Moran, 230 F.3d at 971.
22'Id. at 971-972.
m1d. "Rather than providing an alternative remedy for Ms. Moran to recover benefits, §
4-10 of the HMO Act simply establishes an additional internal mechanism for making
decisions about medical necessity and identifies who will make that decision in those instances
when the HMO and the patient's primary care physician cannot agree on the medical necessity
of a course
2 2 of treatment."Id.

1d. at 972.
PilotLife, 481 U.S. at 49.
225Moran,
230 F.3d at 971
226
1d, at 959.
227U.S. CONST. amend X, supra note 79.
224

2 8 Moran, 230 F.3d at 959.
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In the Moran v. Rush229 decision the Seventh Circuit reached the
right result under ERISA's flawed expansive "relate to" preemption
theory articulated by the Court in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,2 30 by
holding that it was exempted from the "relate to" preemption under
ERISA's saving clause because the Illinois EMO Act regulated
insurance.2 3 1 The Seventh Circuit's rationale for upholding the Illinois
HMO law is much stronger if the Seventh Circuit articulates that the
HMO Act is truly exempted from preemption because of the lack of
implied field and conflict preemption by Congress. 232 It is proper for
the Seventh Circuit to acknowledge ERISA's "relate to" jurisprudence,
but in legal reality "relate to" is not a separate test for preemption,
according to the accurate observations of Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg.2 33 Properly understood, "relate to" is a factor to help the
court consider whether the ordinary implied field or conflict preemption
test2 34 applies to § 4-10 of the Illinois MO Act. The Seventh Circuit
could have help clarify ERISA jurisprudence by holding that since
Congress has not expressly or implicitly preempted state laws
regulating traditional insurance contracts incidentally involving
employer sponsored health plans, the express federal
power given to
35
preemption.2
precludes
insurance
regulate
to
states
There is no Congressional intent to override its grant of power to
the states to regulate insurance under McCarran -Ferguson because of a
229Id.

230Shaw, 463 U.S. at 85.
23lid.

232
L. Damell Weeden, An HMO Does Not Owe An ERISA Fiduciary Duty To Its
Employee Beneficiaries:After Pegram v.Herdrich, Who Will Speak For The Working Class?,
23 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 381, 397 (2002). "Jacobson and Pomfret make an insightful and
convincing argument that the Supreme Court has committed significant error by 'its
misinterpretation of ERISA's legislative history' in its preemption theory. They argue that the
Court's treatment of ERISA's preemptive legislative history is flawed for three reasons: (1)
failure to consider ERISA's broad purposes, (2) failure to limit ERISA's preemption clause to
ordinary field and conflict preemption, and (3) mischaracterization of ERISA as an 'intricate,
comprehensive statute." Id. (footnotes omitted).
23'Dillingham,595 U.S. at 336 (Scalia, J., Ginsburg, J. concurring).
234 Id.
235See 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1994). The McCarran-Ferguson Act states, in pertinent part:
"The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of
the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business." Id. at 15 U.S.C. §
1012(a).
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general conflict with ERISA.23 6 In the absence of a congressional desire
to occupy the insurance field in the managed care industry, this court
will not preempt a state insurance law requiring an independent review
of disputes between an IMO and its insured. 237 In Moran v. Rush the
Seventh Circuit's chief role was to determine whether under the facts of
the case, § 4-10 of the Illinois IMO Act "was an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress' goals" for ERISA under traditional field and conflict
preemption. 238
Because of the lack of evidence of implicit traditional
field/conflict preemption the Court should not allow hypothetical
ERISA's "relate to" preemption theories to reject the considered
judgment of "at least 38 ,239 states that provide patients with the right to
an external review based on a medical claim denial. The Supreme Court
should avoid holding unconstitutional the patient rights laws of more
than three-fourth of the states granting "disgruntled patients a right to
appeal to a state board of physicians if their IMO has refused to pay
for medical treatment. If the board rules the medical treatment was
needed, it can force the IMO to pay for it.",2 4 0 The right of independent
external review of a denial of a medically necessary treatment is too
important for the Supreme Court to take away from the great majority
of American states without express congressional preemption. Before
the Seventh Circuit in Moran v. Rush,24 ' the IMO insurance company
failed its basic traditional required duty
to even meet the ordinary
242
preemption.
field/conflict
garden-variety

6

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 at 67.

237Id.

238d.
239David G. Savage, HMOs To Get A Second Opinion: Upcoming Ruling on Physicians

Panels may Affect State Patients' Rights Laws, ABA JOURNAL (Dec. 2001), available at 87DEC A.B.A. J. 32.
240
1d. at *32.
24'Moran, 230 F.3d at 959.
242
Dillingham, U.S. 519 at 336 (Scalia, J., Ginsburg, J. concurring).
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ORAL ARGUMENT PRESENTATION
BEFORE THE SUPRENIE COURT IN
R USH PR UDENTIAL HMO, INC. V MORAN
It was my original hope that I would be able to reach a very definite
conclusion about how the Supreme Court would likely resolve the
issues presented in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran243 after
writing parts I and Il of this article and then reading the transcript. I
must admit that I am not able to predict in any clear and convincing
way what the Court's ultimate rationale will be for its results in this
case, but I am persuaded that the Court will affirm the decision of the
Seventh Circuit. Now, the $64,000 question is why I think the Court
will affirm the decision of the lower appellate court. What you are
reading below 244
are some of my reactions to reading the transcript of the
oral argument.
As stated at oral argument by Mr. Roberts counsel for
petitioner/defendant Rush, some ERISA cases are "exceedingly
complicated., 245 I agree with Mr. Roberts' conclusion that this case is
not a complicated one under the rationale of PilotLife, but my rationale
for conceding that this case is not complicated under Pilot Life is
contrary to Mr. Roberts.
Mr. Roberts told the Court that Pilot Life held "that ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions were the exclusive remedy for improper
processing of a claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan. The
Illinois independent external review law at issue in this case affords a
different remedy for a beneficiary dissatisfied with an HMO's denial of
benefits. The Illinois law is therefore preempted., 246 Mr. Roberts
argument for ERISA exclusive preemption is seriously incoherent with
traditional conflict/field preemption law. The exclusive civil remedy
theory in processing ERISA claims is not automatically triggered under
PilotLife as Mr. Roberts appears to suggest. Under either the expansive
ERISA relate to preemption or traditional conflict/field preemption,
ERISA's preemption is triggered by a demonstrated conflict in the
243

See 2002 WL 63589 for transcript in Rush PrudentialHMO, Inc. v. Moran.
244Id.
245

1d. *3.

246

1d.
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proposed remedies. There is no demonstrated implied conflict between
§ 4-10 of the Illinois HMO Act and the congressional goal of ensuring
that employees obtain employer sponsored health insurance benefits in
a federal forum because the state is simply providing employees with a
mandated insurance benefit through its insurance regulations. PilotLife
is distinguishable from the instant case because Mississippi, unlike
Illinois, was not regulating insurance and the only way to enforce the
remedy in Pilot Life was through causes of actions that did not qualify
as regulating insurance under relevant state and federal law. The
dissenting opinion before the Seventh Circuit in Moran v. Rush took
the view that Illinois was neither regulating insurance nor following
the
247
proper procedure to secure entitlements under ERISA plans.
It may be stated under Pilot Life that improper claims for ERISA
benefits are likely to conflict with ERISA's exclusive enforcement
provisions and therefore are equally likely to be preempted. However
one does not improperly process a claim under ERISA for preemption
247

Moran 230 F.3d at 973-974 (Posner, with whom Coffey, Easterbrook, and Wood join
dissenting).
The law in this case, like the materially identical law held preempted by the
Fifth Circuit, is not a general regulation of insurance, or even of health
insurance; it is a regulation of HMOs, which are the service providers
under a great many ERISA medical-benefits plans. The law establishes a
system of appellate review of benefits decisions that is distinct from the
provision in ERISA for suits in federal court to enforce entitlements
conferred by ERISA plans. 29 U.S.C. § 132(a)(1)(B). By doing so, the
law interferes with the federally specified system for enforcing such
entitlements. The suit for breach of contract envisaged by the statute
becomes a suit for judicial review of the independent physician's decision.
The Illinois law thus adds heavy new procedural burdens to ERISA plans.
These burdens do not come without cost. The expense of an arbitration by
the independent physician could easily equal the expense of the medical
treatment that the HMO had refused to authorize. Piling on costs in the
administration of ERISA plans will shrink benefits and deter some
employers from offering health insurance at all. In addition, the Illinois
law obviously is intended (responding to the recent torrent of criticisms of
HMOs) to tilt the administration of those plans in favor of participants by
giving them an additional remedy while not giving any additional remedy
to the plan.
The law undermines the statutory purpose of federal
uniformity in the administration of ERISA plans. If such laws are
permissible, the rights of participants in an ERISA plan will change as they
are transferred by their employer from state to state, even though they are
nominally under the same plan."
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purposes by simply enforcing a mandated insurance benefit under state
law in federal court. When an employee seeks to enforce a state
mandated insurance benefit provided by his employer in federal court,
he/she is only attempting to use a state procedural device to enforce her
federal interest in making sure that her employment benefits are neither
undermined nor denied. The verb "readjust" 248 is an appropriate
characterization of the noun remedy 249 in this situation because all § 410 of the Illinois law did was mandate an 11MO insurer to submit a
medical necessity dispute between the primary care physician and the
H-MO insurer for adjustment. When the medical necessity for external
review issue is processed for review, the HMO insurer is required to
follow the recommendation of the reviewer only in those limited
circumstances where the external reviewer agrees with the primary care
physician. When the external reviewer agrees with the recommendation
of the -IMOs primary care physician on the issue of medical necessity,
§ 4-10 of the Illinois HIMO law only mandates that the H-MO insurer
internally readjust its medical necessity determination and follow the
recommendation of an external reviewer. If the MO0 fails to follow the
internal readjustments recommended by the external reviewer under §
4-10, then a person may sue the IMO for "breach of contract as
envisaged by the statute' 250 ( 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B)) for its failure
to honor its contractual obligation to treat those conditions deemed
medically necessary under state law.
Throughout the oral argument, the Supreme Court appeared to be
unnecessarily preoccupied with the issue of whether § 4-10 of the
HMO law and the external review provision in effect creates some type
of arbitration process. For example, the Court addressed the following
question to Mr.Albers, counsel for the respondent/plaintiff Moran.
"QUESTION: ...
Inother words, what can you tell me about the
terms [where] the reviewer acts and says this is, and in part at
least, or ultimately, an independent decision by the reviewer
about medical necessity as opposed to an adjudication of which
side has the better claim, which an arbitrator might make?" 251
24 8

William Statsky, Legal Thesaurus/Dictionary 647 (1985). "Remedy... to readjust."
1d. "Remedy the means by which a right is enforced." Id.
250
Moran, 230 F.2d at 973.
2512002 WL 63589 *22 for transcript in Rush PrudentialHMO, Inc. v. Moran.
249
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The true public policy goal of § 4-10 of the iMO law in granting a
right to external review is not to create a system of arbitration, but
to readjust the contractual bargaining power benefit between health
insurance and health care consumers. Mr. Albers, responding to a
question from the Court says, "This law § 4-10 is limited to the
insurance industry. It's limited to HMO's when they bear risk. It
does transfer risk by the very operation of the statute. The Seventh
is a statute [an external
Circuit and the Fifth Circuit agree that this
252
insurance."
regulates
which
law]
review
CONCLUSION
During oral argument the Court presented the following to counsel for
the petitioner defendant, Mr. Roberts: "Well, we had a case, U-N-U-M
v. Ward, and held that any statute that effectively creates a mandatory
contract term and regulates only insurance companies is an insurance
law under the Savings Clause., 253 I believe at the end of this ERISA
day the Supreme Court will probably conclude that § 4-10 of the
Illinois HMO Act is not preempted by ERISA because it regulates
insurance and that external review provision does not conflict with
ERISA enforcement provision by readjusting the internal processing of
benefits. The Supreme Court should affirm the decision of the Seventh
Circuit in Moran v. Rush and I am predicting it shall find the Illinois
external review law is not preempted. I hope the Court will take this
opportunity to state that ERISA preemption must meet the standard of
ordinary field/conflict preemption in order to be valid.

252

1d. at *28.
Id. at *8.
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